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Berry v. State, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 96 (Dec. 24, 2015)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Summary 
 
 The issue before the Court was an appeal from a district court order dismissing a post-
conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court reversed and remanded holding that the 
district court improperly discounted the declarations in support of the appellant’s petition, which 
included a confession of another suspect, whom the petitioner implicated as the real perpetrator 
at trial. The Court held that these declarations were sufficient to merit discovery, and an 
evidentiary hearing on Petitioner Berry’s gateway actual innocence claim. 
 
On an actual innocence claim a post-conviction petitioner would be entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing if he or she presents specific factual allegations that, if true, show that it is 
likely a reasonable juror would not have convicted them beyond a reasonable doubt based upon 
the new evidence. In order to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate the district 
court must evaluate whether the new evidence presents specific factual allegations that are not 
belied by the record. If it does not, then in order to meet the actual innocence test the court must 
determine that no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner beyond a reasonable 
doubt in light of all the evidence. 
 
In this case, the Court held that the district court judge incorrectly determined that the 
new evidence was not belied by the record. The Court conducted an in-depth examination of the 
facts of the case, and found that the new evidence would likely support a conclusion that the 
petitioner has met the actual-innocence test. The Court emphasized that a district court must 
assume the new evidence is true, and should also examine the evidence that led to the original 
conviction, especially if the new evidence diminishes the strength of the trial evidence. 
 
Background 
 
 In April of 1994, a Carl’s Jr. fast-food restaurant manager was murdered in the course of 
a robbery. Witnesses reported that an African-American male entered the restaurant and pulled a 
gun on the cashier demanding that she open the cash registers. The robber then moved behind 
her, and the cashier ran out of a side door where she encountered another employee on a cigarette 
break. The two ran into the neighboring bar to call the police. Witnesses saw the robber leave in 
a waiting black Cadillac. The manager of the Carl’s Jr. was found dead in the back of the 
restaurant with a single gunshot wound in the back of his left shoulder. Another employee who 
hid in the restaurant through-out the incident reported hearing two gun shots, and two bullets 
were found at the scene.  
                                                          
1 By Brittany L. Shipp. 
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The police received information that identified appellant Demarlo Berry as a possible 
suspect. At least one eye-witness identified him as a suspect right way, and while others were 
less sure initially they positively identified him as the perpetrator at trial.  After he was arrested 
and charged with the crime his cellmate, Richard Iden, also testified against him reporting that 
Berry confessed to him that he committed the crime. However, his cellmate’s stories were 
inconsistent, at trial he could not even confirm if the crime happened at a restaurant. Berry 
denied confessing to his cellmate, and testified in his own defense at trial. Berry testified that he 
had witnessed the crime, and recognized the robber as Steven “Sindog” Jackson, (hereinafter 
“Jackson”) the leader of the San Bernardino Crips gang. However, the jury did not believe Mr. 
Berry’s story and Berry was convicted 11-1 of burglary, robbery, and first-degree murder with 
the use of a deadly weapon. 
 
Procedural History 
  
 Berry timely filed a notice of appeal, and the Court affirmed his conviction.2 Berry then 
filed a timely post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that his trial counsel 
had been ineffective at counseling him to stipulate to a non-unanimous verdict, which was 
denied and affirmed by this court. 3 In September of 2008, Berry filed a second post-conviction 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that the jury received flawed instructions on the 
elements of first-degree murder.4 This petition was denied and again affirmed.5 In 2012, the 
Rocky Mountain Innocence Center  (RMIC) agreed to take on Berry’s case, and in 2014, filed a 
third post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus on Berry’s behalf, at issue here.   
 
Discussion 
 
 Berry filed the third petition for writ of habeas corpus underlying the appeal at issue in 
this case in May 2014, which  was more than 15 years after the issuance of remittitur from his 
direct appeal. This made the petition untimely and successive,6 and since the State affirmatively 
pleaded laches Berry had to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the state.7  
 
                                                          
2  Berry v. State, Docket No. 27585 (Order Dismissing Appeal, June 17, 1997), and the remittitur issued on February 
9, 1998. 
3  Berry v. State, Docket No. 35201 (Order of Affirmance, April 6, 2001). 
4  Kazalyn v. State, 108 Nev. 67, 825 P.2d 578 (1992) (a decision retreated from by this Court in Byford v. State, 
116 Nev. 215, 235, 994 P.2d 700, 713-14 (2000)). 
5  Berry v. State, Docket No. 52905 (Order of Affirmance, September 23, 2009). 
6  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.810(2). 
7  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.800(2). 
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 In order to overcome this presumption, Berry had to prove that the failure to consider the 
petition on its merits would amount to a fundamental miscarriage of justice.8 The Court used the 
Mann standard in determining whether Berry was entitled to the evidentiary hearing on the 
gateway issue of actual innocence.9  
       
Berry’s third post-conviction writ of habeas corpus filed in May of 2014 asserted nine  
new claims. Among them was that there was new evidence demonstrating that Berry was 
actually innocent, and evidence that the State prompted and did not correct perjured testimony, 
from Richard Iden, and failed to disclose transcripts of meetings where the cell-mate was 
coached. There were four declarations offered to support Berry’s petition.  
 
The first declaration was a confession statement from Jackson, whom Berry had 
implicated at trial. In the declaration Jackson described the crime in detail confessing to 
committing it and asserting that Demarlo Berry had no involvement. Jackson admitted to 
shooting the manager when he was having trouble opening the safe. The Second declaration was 
from Richard Iden which recanted his testimony against Berry at trial and states that Berry never 
confessed to him. In addition, he stated that the details of the crime were given to him by the 
detectives, and in exchange for his testimony the State paid for his airfare, hotel and meals 
during the course of the trial. The third declaration was from the RMIC attorney who conducted 
the interview of Jackson. Jackson was serving life in prison in California and had recently 
become a Jehovah’s witness; he wanted to confess in order to “clear his conscience.” The fourth 
declaration was from a woman by the name of Maisha Mack who was acquaintances with 
Jackson during the time period in which the crime took place, and reported that Jackson 
confessed to her that he and his brother had committed the crime.  
 
The district court dismissed Berry’s petition without allowing discovery or conducting an 
evidentiary hearing determining that the declarations were belied by the record. The district court 
was troubled by the omissions in Jackson’s declaration in that it did not mention the cashier, or 
the type of car in which he fled. In addition, the court was concerned that Jackson reported 
shooting the manager near the safe when his body was found some distance away with no blood 
trail. The district court did not acknowledge or address the RMIC attorney’s declaration, and 
dismissed the Iden’s and Mack’s declaration as “naked allegations.” 
 
Berry requested an evidentiary hearing on whether he is actually innocent. This Court 
using the Mann standard determined that the district court improperly dismissed this claim. The 
                                                          
8  See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995); Mitchell v. State, 122 Nev. 1269, 1274, 149 P.3d 33, 36 (2006); 
Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001). 
9  Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 354, 46 P.3d 1228, 1230 (2002) (Internal quotations omitted) “[This court] has long 
recognized a petitioner's right to a post-conviction evidentiary hearing when the petitioner asserts claims supported 
by specific factual allegations not belied by the record that, if true, would entitle him to 
relief.” 
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Court noted that this is a highly factual inquiry, and a district court must make its determination 
in light of all of the evidence which includes a review of “both the reliability of the new evidence 
and its materiality to the conviction being challenged, which in turn requires an examination of 
the quality of the evidence that produced the original conviction.”10 In order to do this, “the 
district court should “assess how reasonable jurors would react to the overall, newly 
supplemented record.”11 
 
“A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed 
at the time the claim was made.”12 The Court determined that the district court improperly ruled 
that Jackson’s declarations were “belied by the record” because the omissions did not result in 
contradictions in the record, nor prove any of the record false. For example, Jackson’s failure to 
mention the black Cadillac was not contradictory to the record, because it was explainable by the 
RMIC attorney’s declaration in which Jackson refused to implicate anyone else in the crime. In 
addition, Jackson’s statement that he shot the manager near the safe, when the body was found in 
the back away from the safe with no blood trail, could be explainable by there not being an exit 
wound on the victim. Therefore, even though the declarations contain factual disputes within the 
record they do not contradict it and thus, an evidentiary hearing is appropriate in this case.13 
 
 In addition, the Court noted that the district court incorrectly dismissed as naked 
allegations, Iden and Mack’s declarations despite the fact that they both contained specific 
factual assertions which were not belied by the record.14 In fact, the material portions of the 
declarations were not without evidentiary support which would at the very least require an 
evidentiary hearing. The Court also noted that the district court’s concern with the fact that it 
took 20 years for the declarants to come forward and exonerate Berry was not valid, because a 
district court’s inquiry into the delay is limited as to how the delay affects the reliability of the 
evidence or why it prevented the defendant from meeting the high standard of actual innocence. 
For example, when waiting would put a prisoner at advantage the timing should be considered.15 
There were no such concerns here, and in fact in 2005, Berry had attempted to secure a 
confession from Jackson through an investigator, but was unsuccessful.  
                                                          
10  See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 ("Schlup makes plain that the habeas court must consider all the evidence, 
old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under rules 
of admissibility that would govern at trial. Based on this total record, the court must make a probabilistic 
determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.") (internal quotations omitted). 
11  Id. 
12  Mann, 118 Nev. at 354, 46 P.3d at 1230. 
13  See Vaillancourt v. Warden, 90 Nev. 431, 432, 529 P.2d 204, 205 (1974) ("Where. . . something more than a 
naked allegation has been asserted, it is error to resolve the apparent factual dispute without granting the accused an 
evidentiary hearing."). 
14  See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (noting that a petitioner's allegation that 
certain witnesses could establish his innocence "was not accompanied by the witness fee names or descriptions of 
their intended testimony" and thus was just a bare or naked claim without any specific factual assertions). 
15  The court uses the example of a prisoner lying in wait for his key witness to die and thus unable to testify against 
the new evidence. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. St. 1934, 1936 (2013).  
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Finally, the court determined that Berry met his burden of due diligence, given that his 
petition depended largely on Jackson’s confession. Since he attempted to secure a confession in 
2005, and Jackson did not become a Jehovah’s Witness until 2013. Thus, the State’s argument 
regarding Berry’s failure to exercise due diligence did not have merit.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In order to determine whether the appellant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when an 
appellant presents specific factual allegations of his innocence that are not belied by the record, a 
district court must determine what a hypothetical jury would have done. And it must do so with 
the assumption that the evidence is true and reliable. At trial the jury was presented with several 
eye witness accounts alleging that Berry was the perpetrator, but no physical evidence. Thus, a 
hypothetical jury would now hear the confession by Jackson whom Berry identified at trial as the 
real perpetrator; testimony of an uninterested witness, Maisha Mack, that Jackson confessed to 
her that he committed the crime; and a recantation of testimony that Berry confessed to the crime 
from his cellmate Richard Iden. The Court determined that “a jury considering such a record . . . 
would likely have reasonable doubt that Berry committed the murder.” 
 
 
